University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 36
Number 2 Spring 2006

Article 14

2006

Recent Developments: Motor Vehicle Admin. v.
Illiano: Pursuant to Section 16-205.1(B)(1) of the
Maryland Transportation Article, "Stop or Detain"
Allows for Officers to Develop a Reasonable
Suspicion That a Driver Is under the Influence of
Alcohol after the Initial Stop
Stephen Gilpatric

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Gilpatric, Stephen (2006) "Recent Developments: Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Illiano: Pursuant to Section 16-205.1(B)(1) of the
Maryland Transportation Article, "Stop or Detain" Allows for Officers to Develop a Reasonable Suspicion That a Driver Is under the
Influence of Alcohol after the Initial Stop," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 36 : No. 2 , Article 14.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol36/iss2/14

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

RECENT DEVELOPMENT

MOTOR VEHICLE ADMIN. v. ILLIANO: PURSUANT TO
SECTION 16-205.1(B)(1) OF THE MARYLAND
TRANSPORT ATION ARTICLE, "STOP OR DETAIN"
ALLOWS FOR OFFICERS TO DEVELOP A REASONABLE
SUSPICION THAT A DRIVER IS UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF ALCOHOL AFTER THE INITIAL STOP
By: Stephen Gilpatric
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that, pursuant to section
16-205.1 of the Maryland Transportation Article, "stop or detain"
allows officers to develop a reasonable suspicion that a driver is
driving under the influence after the initial stop. Motor Vehicle
Admin. v. liliana, 390 Md. 265, 888 A.2d 329 (2005) (emphasis
added). Once the officer has a reasonable suspicion, he can request the
driver submit to a breath test.
In the early morning hours of October 30, 2003, Officer J. Marll
("Marll") was operating a speed radar trap on the shoulder of Route
170 in Anne Arundel County, Maryland. At approximately two
o'clock in the morning, a car pulled up behind Marll's patrol car and
sat idling. Marll decided to check on the driver, Carmelina Illiano
("Illiano"), and backed his patrol car alongside the driver's car. At
this point the driver lowered her driver's side window and Marll
detected the smell of alcohol. As Marll was parking his cruiser behind
her car, he observed Illiano get out and switch seats with the
passenger. Marll approached the passenger side window and asked
Illiano why she had stopped her car on the shoulder of the road.
Illiano stated that she had been drinking and should not be driving.
Based upon this response, and the fact that Illiano appeared
intoxicated, Marll requested that Illiano complete some field sobriety
tests. After Illiano failed the field sobriety tests, Marll placed Illiano
under arrest for driving under the influence.
Initially, Illiano agreed to take a chemical breath test. However,
upon arriving at the barracks, Illiano changed her mind and refused to
submit to the chemical breath test. Accordingly, pursuant to Section
16-205.1(b)(3), Marll took the following actions: (1) he confiscated
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her license, (2) he served her a one year suspension, (3) he issued her a
temporary license, and (4) he informed her of her right to a hearing
before an administrative judge. For the second time within five years,
Illiano had refused to submit to a chemical breath test when requested
to do so; as such Section 16-205.1(b) mandates that her license be
suspended for one year.
On March 9, 2004, Illiano appeared before an Administrative Law
Judge ("ALJ"). The ALJ had to determine whether Marl I had
reasonable grounds to believe that Illiano was driving a motor vehicle
under the influence prior to requesting her to submit to a chemical
breath test. The written findings of the ALJ, discredited Illiano's
testimony of the facts and upheld the one-year suspension of her
license. Illiano filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Circuit Court
for Carroll County.
The circuit court held that Section 16-205.1(b)(2) clearly requires
"an officer have reasonable grounds for detaining someone for driving
under the influence." Further, according to Section 16-205.1 (b)(2),
the results of a field sobriety test are irrelevant in determining whether
the officer had reasonable grounds to originally detain the motorist.
Based upon these conclusions, the circuit court held that Marll did not
have reasonable grounds to detain the petitioner and subsequently
reversed the decision to suspend Illiano's license for one year.
Subsequently, the Motor Vehicle Administration ("MVA") appealed,
and the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals began its analysis of the present case by
noting Judge Eldridge's description of the court's role in reviewing an
administrative agency's decision as being narrow. /lUano, 390 Md. at
274, 888 A.2d at 335; see Md. Aviation Admin. v. Noland, 386 Md.
556,571,873 A.2d 1145, 1154 (2005). Additionally, the Court stated
that the reviewing court has the limited duty of "determining if there is
substantial evidence in the record to support the agency's findings and
conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is based
upon an erroneous conclusion of law." IlUano, 390 Md. at 274, 888
A.2d at 335 (quoting Md. Aviation Admin., 386 Md. at 571, 873 A.2d
at 1154 (2005); see also, United Parcel v. People's Counsel, 336 Md.
569, 576, 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994)). Eldridge stressed that, contrary
to language present in some opinions issued by the Court of Appeals, a
court's duty "on review is not to substitute its judgment for the
expertise of those persons who comprise the administrative agency."
IlUano, 390 Md. at 275, 888 A.2d at 335 (quoting United Parcel, 336
Md. at 576-77, 650 A.2d at 230) (emphasis added). Finally, courts
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should give considerable weight to the statutory interpretations applied
by administrative agencies. ld at 275, 888 A.2d at 335; see Lussier v.
Md Racing Camm., 343 Md. 681, 696-97, 684 A.2d 804, 811-12
(1996).
The Court next addressed the MVA's argument that Section 16205.1 (b)(2) allows for an officer to develop reasonable suspicion that a
motorist is driving under the influence after making the initial stop.
liliana, 390 Md. at 276, 888 A.2d at 336 (emphasis added). This
argument directly contradicted the findings of the circuit court, which
found that any events subsequent to the initial stop cannot be
considered when determining if the officer had reasonable grounds to
detain a motorist. ld at 277, 888 A.2d at 337. Thus, the Court of
Appeals then had to determine which of these two extremely different
interpretations of Section 16-205.1 was correct. ld at 277, 888 A.2d
at 337.
Section 16-205.1 states that "if a police officer 'stops or detains' an
individual who the officer has reasonable grounds to believe is driving
under the influence, the officer may request that the person submit to a
breath test." ld, see liliana, 390 Md. at 278-79,888 A.2d at 337-8.
In its interpretation of Section 16-205.1, the Court focused on the
use of the word "or", in the phrase "stop or detain" contained in
Section 16-205.1. liliana, 390 Md. at 278-9, 888 A.2d at 337-8. The
Court concluded that "the use of the conjunction 'or' indicates that the
officer may have reasonable grounds to believe that the driver is under
the influence either [prior to pulling them over] at the time of the
[initial] stop or, due to events [that transpire] after the [initial] stop."
ld Therefore, an officer can pull over a motorist for any number of
reasons-from generally enforcing the laws of the roadway through the
issuance of a traffic citation-and subsequently develop reasonable
suspicion that such driver is under the influence of alcohol. ld, see
State v. Green, 375 Md. 595, 609, 826 A.2d 486, 494 (2003). Once
the officer develops reasonable suspicion that a motorist is under the
influence, he can request that the person submit to a chemical breath
test. liliana, 390 Md. at 278-79,888 A.2d at 337-78.
Based on this statutory interpretation, the Court held that the ALl's
interpretation of Section 16-205.1 was not based on an erroneous
conclusion of law. ld at 281, 888 A.2d at 339. Thus, the Court was
left to the factual determination of whether there were reasonable
grounds for Marll to believe that Illiano was driving under the
influence. ld. at 282, 888 A.2d at 340-41.
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In reviewing the factual findings of an administrative agency, each
court must employ the substantial evidence test. Id. at 281-82, 888
A.2d at 339. This "requires that an agency's factual determination[s]
be supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light
of the entire record as submitted." Id. (quoting Board of Physician
Quality Assurance v. Mullan, 381 Md. 157, 172,848 A.2d 642, 651
(2004)). Here, the Court found that the record indicated the following
facts: Marll smelled a strong odor of alcohol emanating from Illiano's
vehicle, Illiano made several inculpatory statements, and Illiano failed
multiple field sobriety tests. Id. at 282, 888 A.2d at 339-40. The
Court concluded that the ALJ's finding that Marll had reasonable
grounds to believe Illiano was driving under the influence was
supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 282-83,888 A.2d at 340.
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's
decision, and directed that court to affirm the ALJ's decision
upholding the one-year suspension ofIlliano's license. Id.
The holding of this case makes it clear that police officers are
required to possess reasonable grounds to believe that a motorist is
operating a vehicle under the influence prior to requesting that a
motorist take a chemical breath test. However, those reasonable
grounds can be ascertained at anytime during an encounter with the
police even if that encounter is not initially related to suspicion of
driving under the influence. Practitioner's need to be aware that this
holding removes the requirement that police officers make a threshold
determination as to a reasonable suspicion that a driver is under the
influence of alcohol. That determination can now be made at any point
during a traffic stop.

